A Binary Dilemma: Deciding what Online Content to Allow and What to Take Down
In this post I will have a look at what has been happening in the debate concerning misinformation and disinformation in the web sphere since my last post: Code of Practice on Disinformation. A Comparative Analysis: Methodological Limitations
The public debate between Thierry Breton, the Commissioner [Kommissar] for Internal Market of the European Union (EU) and Mr. Musk’s X (formally Twitter) web platform revolves around the degree to which X is fulfilling its obligations under the EU Digital Services Act (DSA). The manner in which the EU and the press has reported this controversy manifests in the narrative that X is not doing enough to combat disinformation and is not meeting these obligations. As a result, the EU has been forced to take further investigative action in this regard.
This narrative is misleading in that not much is being said
about what X is doing to balance the moral and democratic value of free
expression with the need to combat harmful commentary posted on its online
platform. X’s actions seem to fall on deaf ears at the EU and in most of
the news media. The prevailing attitude is that whatever X does is not
enough and even disingenuous.
This critical narrative was bolstered when the war between Israel and Hamas broke out following Hamas’s attack into southern Israel on October 7, 2023.
On October 10, 2023, Dan Milmo, Global technology editor for The Guardian reported that:
“X’s handling of the Israel-Hamas conflict has come
under scrutiny after a “deluge” of fake posts …. from accounts that have made
false claims or antisemitic comments.”
Mr. Milmo wrote:
“Fake social media accounts are spreading false
information about the Israel-Hamas conflict, with X and TikTok among the
affected platforms, according to disinformation specialists.” Mr. Milmo
cited an Israeli “Social Threat Intelligence Company” called Cyabra
as reporting that:
“One in five social media accounts participating in
online conversations about the Hamas attacks and their aftermath are fake…. 30,000
fake accounts have been spreading pro-Hamas disinformation or gathering
sensitive details about their targets.” Mr. Milmo did not explain how
Cyabra derived these numbers.
On October 12, 2023, John Jeffay writing in Israel21c reported how Cyabra derived these statistics. This was done using “…its machine learning software to analyze two million posts, pictures, and videos in the immediate aftermath of the attacks.” Mr. Jeffay explained that these fake accounts “…. were ‘bots’ set up to generate and spread a mix of half-truths, outright lies and distortions.”
On October 10, 2023, Kommissar Breton, communicated a missive,
under the European Commission (EC) letterhead. He began his letter with the
following remarks:
“Following the terrorist attacks carried out by Hamas against Israel, we have indications that your platform is being used to disseminate illegal content and disinformation in the EU.”
Kommissar Breton reminded Mr. Musk of the “precise
obligations regarding content moderation” under the DSA. Kommissar Breton
also put forward three action points for Mr. Musk to take on board.
“First, you need to be very transparent and clear on
what content is permitted under your terms and consistently and diligently
enforce your own policies…. Second, when you receive notices of illegal content
in the EU, you must be timely, diligent and objective in taking action and
removing the relevant content when warranted…. Third, you need have in place
proportionate and effective mitigation measures to tackle the risks to public
security and civic discourse stemming from disinformation.”
Kommissar Breton detailed the alleged failings of X such
as the circulation of “…. fake and manipulated images and facts
circulating on your platform in the EU, such as repurposed old images of
unrelated armed conflicts or military footage that actually originated from
video games.”
He also flagged the X’s newly-changed
public interest policy, saying that the change “…. left many European
users uncertain about what type of content the platform allows.”
Kommissar Breton concluded his missive with this ultimatum
and warning:
“I urge you to ensure a prompt, accurate and complete response
to this request within the next 24 hours. We will include your answer in our
assessment file on your compliance with the DSA. I remind you that following
the opening of a potential investigation and a finding of non-compliance,
penalties can be imposed.”
Mr. Musk, responded on October 11, 2023, on X writing “Our policy is that everything is open source and transparent, an approach that I know the EU supports,”. He then invited Kommissar Breton to “please list the violations you allude to so that the public can see them…. Merci beaucoup”.
X has not been idle in terms of measures to combat fake and misleading content.
On October 12, 2023, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) reported what the CEO of X, Linda Yaccarino said, in defense of the actions taken by X:
“…. the social media platform had removed hundreds of
Hamas-affiliated accounts and taken action to remove or label tens of thousands
of pieces of content since the militant group's attack on Israel,”.
On October 18, 2023, X @support announced its “Not a Bot” program.
X @support explained this program as follows:
“New, unverified accounts will be required to sign up
for a $1 annual subscription to be able to post & interact with other
posts. Within this test, existing users are not affected.”
The Program was released as a Beta pilot program in New
Zealand and the Philippines.
On October 18, 2023, Roger Montti writing in the Search Engine Journal reported that new X subscribers will have to pay for the following services:
·
Bookmark posts
·
Like posts
·
Post content
·
Reply to posts
·
Repost/Quote posts by other accounts
New users who opt not to subscribe will be restricted to the
following functionality:
·
Follow other members
·
Read tweets
·
Watch videos
According to Mr. Montti, X users have questioned the utility
of the Not a Bot Program, pointing out that out that bot accounts and
scammers already pay for the Blue Check mark to gain access. Contrary to this
view other users have pointed out that X verification and payment
processes may present a hurdle to bot farmers thus discouraging them.
Mr. Montti concluded with the following question:
“Will this truly work? Will be interesting to see if
it does. The bigger question is whether X will roll this out globally if the
test is deemed a success.”
X has also been taking measures by changing the fact checking and blue check functionality. On October 18, 2023, Karissa Bell, Senior Editor of engadget reported that:
“X is making a significant change to its crowd-sourced
fact checking tool in an attempt to stem the flow of misinformation on its
platform. The new rule is one that will be familiar to professional fact
checkers, academics and Wikipedia editors, but is nonetheless new to X’s
approach to fact-checking: the company will now require its volunteer
contributors to include sources on every community note they write.”
Lisa O’Carroll in an article published in The Guardian,
on October 19, 2023, reiterates X’s suspected deviations. Ms. O’Carroll
did not mention X’s Not a Bot program, or the changes made to the X
community notes requiring fact checkers to specify their sources.
Ms. O’Carroll concentrates our attention to Kommissar Breton’s charge regarding X’s deceptive user interface in terms of how the blue check marks work on the X platform. Previously blue check functionality was only available to “…. to verified users in the public eye, including ministers and celebrities.” The policy now is to provide the functionality to X subscribers that pay to have access to the blue check function.
The EU investigation will try and determine the possibility
that searches on X will deceive the X user base, when viewing the
content, spread by blue tick accounts. Users when viewing the content “…. might
mistake….” Such material as coming “…. from verified sources in the pre-Musk
service.”
Also, according to Ms. O’Carroll the EU has concerns with the
degree to which X complies with European languages citing
“reports” that X only has one moderator in the Netherlands.
The EU will also look into the “…. the effectiveness
of X’s “community notes”, which allow the public to comment on the veracity or
legality of posts.”
Regarding how things develop Ms. O’Carroll reported that any
actions and investigations undertaken by the EU are not subject to a particular
timeline and the EU says that such actions “…. would take as long as it
takes but it could apply unspecified” interim measures before the investigation
concluded if appropriate.”
Regarding the details of the proceedings these “would
focus on the functioning of the notice and action mechanism for illegal
content, which involves legal orders from police or other authorities in the EU
to take down content within one hour.”
As well as the above measures, X published its DSA Transparency Report in November 2023. This document has received limited attention in the media. It affirms X’s commitment to transparency and details its content moderation practices and enforcement activities.
“This report covers the content moderation activities
of X’s international entity Twitter International Unlimited Company (TIUC)
under the Digital Services Act (DSA), during the date range August 28, 2023 to
October 20, 2023.”
X’s commitment to freedom of expression is reiterated
as follows:
“X was founded on a commitment to transparency. We
also want people on X to feel they are able to freely express themselves, while
also ensuring that conversations on X are safe, legal and unregretted. When you
think about some of the world’s most powerful moments, movements, and memes,
they prevailed because people had a place to express their ideas, challenge
conventional norms, and demand better. That’s why free expression matters.”
X emphasised that “free expression” can
“coexist” with “platform safety”.
With respect to the notion of free speech X points
out its objective as being “…. reflective of real conversations happening
in the world,” even if many may regard some conversations as “….
offensive, controversial, and/or narrow-minded….”
X emphasises that it “…. welcomes everyone to
express themselves” but “…. will not tolerate behaviour that
harasses, threatens, dehumanises or uses fear to silence the voices of others.”
The Transparency Report refers us to the Twitter
International Unlimited Company (TIUC) terms of Service and Rules as a
means in achieving the aspiration to “…. ensure everyone feels safe
expressing themselves”. These terms are continuously reviewed by X.
In the Report X states its commitment “…. to
fair, informative, responsive, and accountable enforcement.” This is despite X’s admission that
they have often been caught “in a binary paradigm of whether to leave
content up, or take it down.”
X is also cognisant of the responsibility associated
with enforcement because the “…. risks of getting it wrong at the
extremes are great”. This arises
from the very nature of trying to reconcile the dilemma involved in
leaving “…. up content that’s really dangerous….” without
running the “…. the risk of censorship”. These
difficulties are expressed as follows:
“Our point is: if you do either, you need to be right.
And we live in a world with many shades of grey.”
Furthermore, X is working “…. to remove
dangerous and illegal content and accounts. ….” X, also in responding to reports
of illegal material does act “on content that violates local laws….
“ . By the same token X emphasises that their experience
has shown “…. that there are other types of content where a range of
potential reasonable, proportionate, and effective approaches, that also seek
to balance fundamental rights, can be appropriate.”
The Transparency Report explains the three-pronged approach
taken by X:
“You can think about how we moderate on X in three
buckets: content and accounts that remain, are restricted, and are removed.”
Regarding the “remain” bucket the key point
made is that the vast majority of content is “healthy” in that it
meets the standards specified in the TIUC “…. meaning it does not violate
our TIUC Terms of Service and Rules or our policies such as Hateful Conduct,
Abuse & Harassment, and more.” Nonetheless, a post may not violate
a policy but there still could be people who are offended by it.
The “restrict” bucket implements X’s “Freedom
of Speech, Not Reach enforcement philosophy”. Content seen as
potentially violating X’s policies in the sense that it is “…. awful, but
lawful—we restrict the reach of posts by making the content less discoverable,
and we’re making this action more transparent to everyone. “
In a post published on April 17, 2023, X describes this approach as follows:
“Restricting the reach of Tweets, also known as
visibility filtering, is one of our existing enforcement actions that allows us
to move beyond the binary “leave up versus take down” approach to content
moderation.”
The Transparency Report elaborates on this by pointing out
that visibility filtering involves the application of a “restricted
reach label” on content. When applied X removes
the possibility of engaging with the content such that “…. its reach is
restricted to views occurring directly on the author's profile.”
The initial implementation of the restricted content
approach was limited to “Hateful Conduct”. More recently the
approach has been extended to include “…. Abuse & Harassment, Civic
Integrity, and Violent Speech”.
When restricting content X has “…. a range of
enforcement options for the variety of use cases….” One of these
options is by temporarily switching an offending account to “read-only
mode” effectively placing limitations on the capacity of an account to
post and repost.
Regarding the removal of content access is withheld
for content that is reported as being illegal with specific jurisdictions.
Content considered to be “extremely harmful” such as “….
targeted violent threats, targeted harassment, or privacy violations….” is
removed via account suspension and return to the platform being made conditional
on the deletion of the offending content.
The Transparency Report states the efforts it has made to
date:
“We've made significant progress towards improving the
safeguards to protect our users and our platform, but we know that this
critical work will never be done. X is committed to ensuring the safety and
health of the platform and fulfilment of its DSA Compliance obligations through
our continued investment in human and automated protections.”
Clearly, all of X’s efforts described above have not been persuasive enough for the EU. On December 18, 2023, Kommissar Breton proclaimed “formal infringement proceedings” against X for suspected:
·
Breaches of obligations to counter illegal
content and disinformation
·
Breaches of Transparency obligations, and
·
Deceptive user interface design
Also, on December 18, 2023 the EC published a press release announcing that the is opening formal proceedings against X under the DSA that also provides a more detailed list of possible infringements.
Clearly not happy with the actions taken by X, over
the previous several months the EC’s investigation will, to quote the Press Release
in full focus on the following areas and concerns:
·
The compliance with the DSA obligations
related to countering the dissemination of illegal content in the EU, notably
in relation to the risk assessment and mitigation measures adopted by X to
counter the dissemination of illegal content in the EU, as well as the
functioning of the notice and action mechanism for illegal content in the EU
mandated by the DSA, including in light of X's content moderation resources.
·
The effectiveness of measures taken to
combat information manipulation on the platform, notably the effectiveness of
X's so-called ‘Community Notes' system in the EU and the effectiveness of
related policies mitigating risks to civic discourse and electoral processes.
·
The measures taken by X to increase the
transparency of its platform. The investigation concerns suspected shortcomings
in giving researchers access to X's publicly accessible data as mandated by
Article 40 of the DSA, as well as shortcomings in X's ads repository.
·
A suspected deceptive design of the user
interface, notably in relation to checkmarks linked to certain subscription
products, the so-called Blue checks.
The EC links these concerns to specific articles in the DSA:
“If proven, these failures would constitute
infringements of Articles 34(1), 34(2) and 35(1), 16(5) and 16(6), 25(1), 39
and 40(12) of the DSA. The Commission will now carry out an in-depth
investigation as a matter of priority. The opening of formal infringement
proceedings does not prejudge its outcome.”
Aljazeera, on December 18, 2023, reported X’s efforts to comply with the DSA quoting a statement issued by X:
“X remains committed to complying with the Digital
Services Act, and is cooperating with the regulatory process,”
This Statement continued by emphasising the imperative that
the “…. process remains free of political influence and follows the law”.
Having made this point the Statement reinforced X’s commitment to “work
tirelessly” to ensure freedom of expression within “…. a
safe and inclusive environment for all users on our platform.”
In conclusion, X makes the obvious case that in a
world where there are "shades of grey" it is not easy
to reconcile freedom of expression with accountable law enforcement without "running
the risk of censorship". This is something that media reporting
does not stress when reporting the trials X is having with the EU
vis-à-vis the DSA.
X has produced the following changes and programs to
improve the transparency of the platform:
·
Not a bot program
·
Community Notes Fact checking changes
·
Blue check changes
·
Freedom of Speech, Not Reach enforcement
philosophy
·
Transparency Report
The EC and Kommissar Breton would be aware of these measures
but in their latest combative challenge downplay the changes made by X.
Also, they do not acknowledge the point X is trying to make about the
need to achieve a level of “proportionality” when it comes to
monitoring and removing dangerous content and adopting effective approaches
that protect fundamental rights. The pressure on X to justify its
transparency is set to continue and the more pressure applied the more the
spectre of political interference castes its dark shadow over online discourse
within the EU.
The Australian Human Rights Commission, writing within the
context of the debate in Australia concerning the Australian Federal Government’s
proposed Communications Legislation Amendments Bill highlights the risks
of providing government authorities with increased powers to combat
misinformation and misinformation arguing, like X of the need to “….
be balanced with ensuring we don’t unduly affect freedom of expression.” The
Human Rights Commission warned that:
“There are inherent dangers in allowing any one body – whether it be a government department or social media platform – to determine what is and is not censored content. The risk here is that efforts to combat misinformation and disinformation could be used to legitimise attempts to restrict public debate and censor unpopular opinions…. Striking the right balance between combating misinformation or disinformation and protecting freedom of expression is a challenge with no easy answer.”
References
Article 16, Notice and action mechanisms - the Digital Services Act (DSA)
Article 25, Online interface design and organisation - the Digital Services Act (DSA)
Article 34, Risk assessment - the Digital Services Act (DSA)
Article 35, Mitigation of risks - the Digital Services Act (DSA)
Article 39, Additional online advertising transparency - the Digital Services Act (DSA)
Article 40, Data access and scrutiny - the Digital Services Act (DSA)
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