A Discourse on Laurel and Hardy Statecraft

I will devote the topic of this post to an article entitled Putin and Xi are the Laurel and Hardy of statesmen – but it’s no laughing matter published in The Guardian on August 13, 2023, written by Simon Tisdall. There is so much to unpack in this commentary. Mr. Tisdall brings to our attention a litany of misdeeds resulting from the hubris of two leaders of very powerful nations, namely President Vladimir Putin of the Federation Russia (Russia) and President Xi Jinping of the Peoples Republic of China (China); both strategic rivals in the view of policy makers in the United States of America (US or USA). These two men are likened, without the laughs to the Laurel and Hardy comic duo. The language used by Mr. Tisdall is full of mockery and if directed, in its harshness at lesser mortals would cause such pain that it could be classed as a form of aggression; a form of bullying that is libelous to the point of seeking legal redress.

As a piece of misinformation, the commentary works beautifully. It is full of slogans and its selective use of facts is masterly. The piece is written to appeal to the views of typical Guardian readers thus providing comfort and a kind of justification for their beliefs. As a result, such a reader is less disposed to question the assertions, clichés and half-truths made in this article. He accuses the leadership of Russia and China of numerous economic and societal misdeeds and stuff ups.

So, if you are an average Guardian reader in the West who does not closely follow international events you can be excused for feeling alarmed by the antics of these two Russian and Chinese tragically comedic authoritarians out to wreak havoc on the “rules based” order everywhere. You may even be convinced that regime change in Russia and China is justified not only to save the hapless citizens of these countries but also to preserve the internal and external security and economic wellbeing of your own nation.

As mentioned above Mr. Tisdall has packed his article with an exhaustive list of reprehensible things the two dictatorial comedians he alleges to have tragically done. He describes President Putin’s foolery in the following demi-god like terms: “Putin has remade Russia in his image: lawless, vilified, distrusted.”

In the opening paragraphs of his article Mr. Tisdall applies razor sharp sarcasm and cliche pop-culture based psychological observation. His literary allusions characterise President Xi in a masterly piece of satire that draws in themes from ancient Greece, the history of the communist movement and American popular psychology and popular music culture.

Words and phrases like “…. dictatorship issues “, “…. presumes,”, “…. supreme control”, “channelling”, “Mao Zedong like a card-carrying Communist party Zeus”, “repeatedly messes up” and the reference to the song and lyrics of “Moby’s Extreme Ways…. “Then it fell apart ... Like it always does.” reveal a masterful control of the art of propaganda. Common sense tells me that these words far from denoting reality are as it were “over the top”.

Here are some of the main mess ups Mr. Tisdall attributes to President Xi’s authoritarian posturing:

·         Presumption of full-control;

·         Endangering the Chinese “miracle”;

·         Mishandling the Covid pandemic;

·         Chronic disregard for basic human rights and freedoms;

·         Turned public and private life in China’s cities into an oppressive, 24-hour surveillance nightmare;

·         As a result of his rule by fear China’s exports and imports, domestic retail sales, private and foreign investment, youth employment and GDP are all cratering;

·         Blithe alienation of friends, neighbours and key trading partners;

·         Mania for conformity and uniformity at home, plus his hostile outward stance – espionage plots, intellectual property theft, exploitative debt diplomacy, hollow “peacemaking” in Israel-Palestine; and

·         Causing the hardening in defence and security doctrines and commercial postures of the US, the EU, Britain, Germany.

There is so much to unpack in this list. For the purposes of brevity, I will hone in on the notion of President Xi’s authoritarianism as this is what Mr. Tisdall asserts to be the fundamental cause of China’s woes.

Mr. Tisdall, in his mastery of pop culture shows his contempt for President Putin and President Xi by labelling them as the “Laurel and Hardy duo for the modern age” who should be “booted out without a second thought – then put on trial.”

Regarding this apparent desire for regime change Mr. Tisdall is careful not to mention the degree of legitimacy these Russian and Chinese authoritarians have in their respective countries. He also takes care not to bring to the attention of his readers the different perspectives, relative to his liberal viewpoint these peoples have in terms of how they perceive legitimacy, political participation and the notion of authoritarianism.

Regarding China even The Atlantic Council offered a nuanced approach lacking in Mr. Tisdall’s commentary. It posed the question: How much support does the Chinese Communist Party really have?

In answering this question and writing in April 2021, the Atlantic Council author Dexter Tiff Roberts made the following observation:

“With the major caveat that limits on free expression affect the Chinese people’s willingness to openly criticize their leaders, polls show growing support for the party. And that is understandable. People’s lives have gotten much better over the last few decades, and it is natural for the Chinese to take pride in the growing strength of their country after years of feeling like a little brother to an often hectoring United States.”

Mr. Roberts cites an article published by The Harvard Kennedy School’s Ash Centre in 2020 entitled Understanding CCP Resilience: Surveying Chinese Public Opinion Through Time . The authors, Edward Cunningham, Tony Saich, and Jessie Turiel wrote:

“We find that first, since the start of the survey in 2003, Chinese citizen satisfaction with government has increased virtually across the board.”

The Harvard Business Review in its May-June 2021 issue sets about explaining what the West gets wrong about China. The authors Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson (henceforth referred to as he HBR authors) describe “three fundamental misconceptions” the West has of China. These misconceptions are based on three myths.

With his comments we see that Mr. Tisdall claims to speak for the “aspirations” of the citizenry of China whose “human rights and freedoms” have been chronically disregarded and inhibited by President Xi. Mr. Tisdall laments that President Xi’s “egregious abuses” as scaring “China’s international reputation and inhibit citizens’ aspirations”.

The unspoken assumption here is that these citizens share the same liberal democratic aspirations Mr. Tisdall does. If I am correct in this then Mr. Tisdall presents as someone who holds all three of the fundamental misconceptions and myths described by the HBR authors. The first of which is that:

“Economics and Democracy Are Two Sides of the Same Coin”

As an example of what the HBR authors label “many westerners” Mr. Tisdall appears to assume that economic progress in China should have resulted in more democracy. So, China’s stellar growth trajectory and the accompanying prosperity should have seen the Chinese State transition from an authoritarian communist form of government to an economy and political system based on the “liberal model”.  This lament is not necessarily felt by all of citizenry of China if we go by what the HBR authors spelled out in their analysis of western mythology regarding China.

The HBR authors observed that China’s economic growth has been achieved within the “context of stable communist rule”. This indicates that the interdependence and mutual attraction between democracy and economic growth is not as strong as people in the West may think. Indeed, according to the HBR authors many Chinese view China’s recent advances in reducing poverty levels, investments in infrastructure and “world-class” technological innovations to be a product of the “authoritarian” state governing China. As a case in point, in the eyes of these Chinese citizens the state has done a better job in tackling COVID-19 in terms of the lower death rates when compared to the West.

The HBR authors also point out that President Xi had already made it clear in 2017 that with respect to reforms in the three critical areas of “…. financial risk reduction, pollution reduction and poverty alleviation,” the objective of the Communist Party of China (CPC) would be to “solidify the [Authoritarian] system rather than to change it”.

As the HBR authors put it:

“In much Western analysis the verb most commonly attached to China’s reforms is “stalled.” The truth is that political reform in China hasn’t stalled. It continues apace. It’s just not liberal reform.”

This is what has made western commentators lash out at President Xi; Mr. Tisdall’s commentary is just an extreme example of this angst. The second misconception of western commentators is the assumption that:

“Authoritarian Political Systems Can’t Be Legitimate”

From a liberal perspective authoritarian rule is not legitimate. This is consistent with Mr. Tisdall’s claim that President Xi’s egregious “…. chronic disregard for basic human rights.” Indeed, it can be said that Mr. Tisdall is disappointed as he appears to have expected, to use the words of the HBR authors “China to reduce its role as investor, regulator, and, especially, intellectual property owner”. I contend that Mr. Tisdall does not acknowledge that these governmental functions, which according to the HBR authors are seen by the Chinese citizenry as a fundamental and legitimate role of the state in the mixed economy that is the PRC.

The HBR authors when discussing the outlook of many Chinese write that as well as believing that democracy is not a necessary condition for economic success also believe that the authoritarian form of their state system is legitimate. This view is based on the effectiveness of the State and the history of China; a history which involved the fending off and victory over foreign invaders and colonial exploitation.

Another factor Mr. Tisdall does not explain to his readers is the important role of Marxist-Leninist thinking that underpins the State in China. The HBR authors in their paper have observed that for many Chinese this type of political system is still regarded as legitimate, a fact that many westerners, including Mr. Tisdall don’t seem to appreciate the significance of.

As a Marxist-Leninist State the CPC government of China is focused on economic outcomes such as the public ownership of assets as a means to distribute the nation’s wealth along equitable lines. Another factor that needs to be understood is that as well as economic outcomes a state based on Marxist-Leninist principles also has the aim of ensuring control of the economic system as a basis to achieve the required outcomes.  

According to the HBR authors this Marxist-Leninist control is also extended to the political sphere. Indeed, the CPC, uses Leninist methods to select its leadership. The application of these methods is regarded by many Chinese citizen’s to be a source of legitimacy as it is viewed as being the basis for the development competent leaders.

Leaders, once selected by the CPC are put through the process of gaining skills by first showing that they can administer towns and afterwards provinces. Once these leaders have demonstrated their managerial prowess they then evolve into a position in the senior leadership and ultimately the Politburo of the CPC.  The HBR authors write that CPC leadership selection based on the “Leninist rule book” is seen in China as not being as arbitrary and less prone to nepotism as is the political system in Western countries.

Leninism manifests itself in the political discourse conducted in the PRC where principles such as “struggle” and “contradiction” are viewed as the elements, required in conflict resolution to “….  force a necessary and even healthy confrontation that can help achieve a victorious outcome,”.

To get ahead in society familiarity with Marxist-Leninist political thought is also required if one wants to join the CPC or attend university. This underpinning training is done through compulsory courses. Also, at the societal level the principles of the Marxist, Leninist, Maoist and President Xi himself permeate popular culture.

The HBR authors make the point that this Chinese form of authoritarianism is utilised to foster the trust of the Chinese citizenry. This is done through “…. ways that would be considered highly intrusive in a liberal democracy.” They cite the example of the use of “big data” by the City of Rongcheng that supports a social credit score system. The data gathered through surveillance and data-capturing technology is used to give people individualised scores. This is what Mr. Tisdall has to say about the issue of mass surveillance in the PRC:

“In 10 years, he has turned public and private life in China’s cities into an oppressive, 24-hour surveillance nightmare where the state, a new Leviathan with Chinese characteristics, preys on individuals.

Mr. Tisdall is referring to the PRC's Social Credit System (SCS). To get a better, and more objective understanding of what the societal aims of the SCS are I refer you to a very considered and detailed paper entitled The Social Credit System and China’s Rule of Law published in the Mapping China Journal written by Marianne Von Blomberg.

The HBR authors paint a sober depiction, when compared with Mr. Tisdall’s comments concerning the SCS. They depict it as a way for the authorities to foster the trust of the Chinese citizenry by rewarding or punishing individuals in accordance with their “political or financial virtues or vices”.

The HBR authors make the point that although this is an “appalling prospect” in the eyes of western liberals, in the mind of many Chinese citizens the SCS, is not perceived as, to use Mr, Tisdall’s words a “Leviathan with Chinese characteristics” used to “prey on individuals”. Rather it is seen as being a “reasonable” part of the “social contract” forged between the individual and the State. Under the terms of this contract the SCS offers financial and social benefits for individuals that score highly. For example, mortgage applications have a better chance of being approved when citizens have a good credit rating. For those people that don’t have a good credit rating then such benefits accruing from a loan may be curtailed.

Another misunderstanding many western commentators have concerns the traditional Confucian thinking with respect to ideas such as “benevolence” and “harmony”. To the Chinese these concepts convey the importance of peace and cooperation as things arising from an appropriate respect for hierarchy. To westerners versed in “post-Enlightenment” thinking this kind of approach is “antithetical”. To the Chinese hierarchy and equality are inherently concepts that underpin societal harmony.

The HBR authors point out that in China the Marxist-Leninist State is regarded as “legitimate but also effective”. By not considering this fact Western policy makers in deciding how to “engage” with China will not be in a position “…. to make more-realistic long-term decisions about how to deal with or invest in the country”. This is a point that Mr. Tisdall has failed to communicate to his readers in his commentary. I agree with the HBR authors; by not factoring in the perceived legitimacy granted to the State by citizens Mr. Tisdall and likeminded western policy makers “…. can also mislead those seeking to engage with China”.

The third myth according to the HBR authors is:

“The Chinese Live, Work, and Invest Like Westerners”

Another observation made by the HBR authors that leads to misunderstanding is that western commentators make the mistake of thinking that other societies think the same way as they do. They fail to see that the Chinese as a people “…. approach decisions very differently from Westerners—in both the time frames they use and the risks they worry about most… this may be the most difficult assumption for Westerners to overcome.”  I would add that this is a mistake that Mr. Tisdall also makes in his commentary.

The HBR authors point out that from the perspective of individuals and the state the motive that drives Chinese decision-making is “to provide security and stability in an unpredictable world.” With respect to the Chinese State this is reflected in its implementation of Leninist control that looks to long term returns on investments through Soviet style five-year plans. Examples of this long-term thinking include projects that involve government intervention to build an “eco-civilization” in projects such as smart cities and energy efficient housing. Without the equivalent significant state intervention these kinds of projects are happening very slowly in the West. Chinese policy makers search for “…. ways to gain more control and sovereignty over the future, now play a much longer game than the West does. This shared quest for predictability explains the continuing attractiveness of an authoritarian system in which control is the central tenet.”

We see that Mr. Tisdall misunderstands the degree to which the Chinese authoritarianism is held to be legitimate in the minds of many Chinese citizens and the degree to which Marxist-Leninist principles permeate the leadership and in doing so lending a degree of legitimacy to the CPC.

I would like to know draw your attention to another aspect of Mr. Tisdall’s commentary. This is the idea that President Xi in his bumbling and autocratic way, has set about on a “messianic” effort to “…. make China great again to keep himself and the party in power”. This is why China’s “…. exports and imports, domestic retail sales, private and foreign investment, youth employment and GDP are all cratering.” Furthermore, this is the reason for “…. China’s property market is a destabilising, bottomless hole of debt. Consumer and business confidence is shot.”

He has a few choice words for President Xi who he depicts as an accident prone “messianic” figure accumulating “unchecked personal power”. This “drive”, according to Mr. Tisdall is jeopardising the “miracle” of the Chines economy. Once again, he does not explain what the truth of the matter is; preferring to solely place the blame on President Xi. There is no global context given here. I am referring to the fear that the USA has about the hegemonic challenge of China.

Think of the sanctions, tariffs and embargos on technology and confrontational rhetoric colouring the western public’s image of China and curtailing the economic development of China.  It was the actions of western policy makers to curtail China’s military and economic development that is a major factor curtailing China’s growth. The trade and technological warfare waged by the USA, especially during the administration of President Trump and now under President Biden aimed at China.

There is discordant note in Mr. Tisdall’s commentary. On the one hand he says that the responsibility for the Chinese economy cratering rests on President Xi’s shoulders. On the other hand, he acknowledges the following:

“Not all these problems can be laid at Xi’s door, but perhaps they should be. Being in charge of everything means being blamed for everything.”

Having written this Mr. Tisdall makes the following concession to truth: “Beijing says it’s all part of a US-led anti China campaign. But such measures hurt the west, too. Nobody wins.”

 If this is the case to paraphrase Oliver Hardy, we should also blame this fine mess on policy makers and leaders in the US and its allies. Their actions to curtail the development of China have had impacts on western economies as well. This is due to the tight coupling of financial, manufacturing and logistics between western economies and China’s economy. From this we see that Mr. Tisdall half-heartedly concedes that the situation is not all President Xi’s fault.

To lend weight to his case Mr. Tisdall selectively and thereby misleadingly quotes Adam Posen, President of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. According to Mr. Tisdall, Mr. Posen in his diagnosis of China believes that there are “systemic” limits to what an economy like China’s with its “weaknesses” can achieve.  Mr. Posen advocates a “reliable cure”; that is to curtail the “…. government’s intrusion into economic life.” An aspect of this cure, according to Mr. Posen is “credibly assuring ordinary Chinese people and companies” of this.

By quoting Mr. Posen in this way Mr. Tisdall unwittingly acknowledges the HBR authors’ insight that in the eyes of many Chinese the Marxist-Leninist state is still legitimate because it has delivered positive outcomes. Mr. Tisdall, like Mr. Posen would like to disabuse the Chinese people of this kind of thinking in order to be liberated from the shackles of President Xi and socialist principles.

Mr. Tisdall does not highlight Mr. Posen’s membership of the Council of Foreign Relations and the Trilateral Commission. It has been suggested that these organisations advocate neoliberal geopolitics. So, at the very least we need to be wary when it comes to the things Mr. Posen says about China.

In order to get an alternative appreciation of the state of the economy of China I refer your attention the World Bank June 2023 report. From this we see that things are not as bleak as Mr. Tisdall and Mr. Posen paint them to be:

“China’s GDP growth is projected to rise to a 5.6 percent in 2023, led by a rebound in consumer

spending. Growth will be led by a recovery in consumer demand, particularly for services. Capital

spending in infrastructure and manufacturing is expected to remain resilient. Net exports are

expected to weigh on growth, due to softer external demand coupled with a modest acceleration

in import growth reflecting improved domestic demand.”

We should also note what Economist Professor Jeffrey Sachs, Director of the Center for Sustainable Development at Columbia University had to say recently, in an article concerning the US Economic War on China about the Chinese economy. Mr. Sachs points out that China’s economy is “slowing down” in terms of GDP growth in 2023 as being “…. less than 5%, far below the high growth rates that China enjoyed until the late 2010s”.

Professor Sachs observes that the behaviour of the Western press; a narrative is being pushed by Mr. Tisdall as follows:

“China’s supposed misdeeds: a financial crisis in the real-estate market, a general overhang of debt, and other ills. Yet much of the slowdown is the result of US measures that aim to slow China’s growth. Such US policies violate World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and are a danger to global prosperity. They should be stopped.” The “ani-China policies” of “US policy-making” have resulted “…. in a reversal of China’s exports to the US.”

Mr. Tisdall and Mr. Posen I contend can be counted as those in the Western Press pushing the misleading narrative about China’s (read President Xi) “supposed misdeeds “.  Perhaps President Xi is not doing such a bad job when all is said and done.