The Hard Fight Ahead

On August 1, 2023, the government funded Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) posted a commentary entitled: Russia has launched a new offensive in Luhansk — here's what it tells us about Putin's strategy in Ukraine by Major General Mick Ryan (retired); hereafter referred to as Mr. Ryan.

In this sober and somewhat gloomy assessment of the fighting Mr. Ryan lays out the recent history of the Russia-Ukraine war highlighting the “costly” but “stunning” performance of the Ukrainian army in the Kharkov and Kherson offensives of late last year. He also discusses the choices facing Ukraine in how to handle the challenges in the southern front and northern fronts of the war.  Mr. Ryan also explains key “takeaways” about what he perceives to be President Vladimir Putin’s strategy.

In my post I will point out that some of the assumptions made by Mr. Ryan concerning these perceptions of President Putin’s thinking, and the disposition of Russian Society and European public do not necessarily bare out the hope that the Russian military, economic and political system will implode in on itself and that the European public is united behind NATO’s war effort.

With indications that the current Ukrainian offensive is in a standstill in the south and the Russians slowly advancing in the north Ukraine is in a terrible situation, facing a still formidable Russian military. Mr. Ryan is correct in saying that Ukraine has some very difficult military choices. Instead of acknowledging that Ukraine is struggling in terms of men and material Mr. Ryan warns us all of the “hard fight” yet to come.

Mr. Ryan does not factor in the use of peace negotiations in this calculus. I suspect he may be correct in doing so as none of the sides in this conflict appear, at least publicly to be prepared to make any compromises. There have been halfhearted attempts with back-channel discussions between representatives of the USA and Russia, representations made by countries in Africa, attempts by Ukraine to convince countries in the global south to jump off of the fence and side with it by accepting its peace plan which basically demands the capitulation of Russia and the Russian Government. None of which is acceptable to Russia. So, it appears that the war will continue.

Mr. Ryan outlines what he perceives the Russian war strategy in Ukraine in terms of three key takeaways.

“First, the Russians probably want to draw as many Ukrainian formations away from the southern offensive as possible. The Ukrainians did not achieve the rapid penetration that many unrealistically expected in the opening days of their counter-offensive.”

From this we see that Mr. Ryan acknowledges that the expectations of the “many” concerning the current Ukrainian counter-offensive were overly optimistic. I assume that he is referring to the western media and others who thought that Ukraine would rapidly crash through Russian defences in the south of Ukraine, cause panic amongst the Russian soldiers and reach the Sea of Azov and lay siege to Crimea all within a short time thereby forcing Russia to the negotiating table in a weakened position.

Mr. Ryan must realise, although he does not directly say so the reality of the situation. Ukraine’s costly summer counter offensive that started on June 4 and the Ukrainian army has not broken through the so called Surovikin defensive line indeed it has not been able to reach it. Fighting is restricted to a zone of control in the so-called grey zone between the two armies with Ukraine capturing a very small amount of territory spread across the long battle front.

See the following analysis 'Surovikin Defensive Line' Impregnable, Kiev Should Sue for Peace to Avoid Further Losses concerning the formidable nature of the Surovikin defensive line.

Mr. Ryan must appreciate the difficulties involved in breaking through the formidable Russian defence lines. Mr. Ryan continues:

“Second, the recent Belgorod incursions, the Wagner Group mutiny, Moscow drone attacks (including one over the weekend), and Kerch Bridge attacks have highlighted the relative weakness of Russia's defence of its border with Ukraine.”

Yes, events, embarrassing as they are to Russia do highlight vulnerabilities in the places specified by Mr. Ryan. Here he hints at the criticisms from within Russia itself concerning the way the Russian government responded to the limited border incursions on the part of pro-Ukrainian Russian volunteers at the time. Also, internal Russian criticism over the Kerch bridge security and Wagner Group “mutiny” are indicators of potential instability and hints that President Putin’s control of Russia may not that solid. I am assuming that Mr. Ryan is basing his stance on the kind of views expressed in the commentary Putin is losing control of Russia published by the Atlantic Council.

Mr. Ryan seems to be hinting that internal divisions with Russian Society and military circles may undermine President Putin and perhaps through some kind of regime change facilitate a battlefield victory for Ukraine. It is debatable whether these events have weakened resolve within Russian society itself.

Mr. Ryan’s comments also seem to assume that the Russians have been doing nothing to address the weaknesses in terms of border control and the threat posed by drone Ukrainian drone attacks on places like Moscow. Also, events such as the Wagner affair and the way in which it was resolved, with little bloodshed by President Putin may have strengthened his position with within Russian Society.

“A third takeaway is that Russia retains its strategic objective of securing the Donbas and incorporating it into the Russian Federation. If the Ukrainian offensive does reclaim its southern territories, Putin still needs to be able to claim that he has retained the territory that he recognised as part of Russia in 2022. In asking This would be a minimalist outcome for Putin, and one that he probably accepts he needs as a fall-back position if the worst (for Russia) occurs in the south.”

This takeaway is based on the assumption that Ukraine’s southern offensive is successful.  In this scenario Mr. Ryan in an oblique way accepts that the Ukrainians may not be able to win the Donbass back from Russia.  However, Mr. Ryan appears to detect a weakness in President Putin’s political position vis-à-vis Russian society such that he needs to hold onto the Donbass, as a part of Russia as a bargaining chip and a way to legitimise the war effort in the eyes of Russian society.

In terms of where the war is headed Mr. Ryan asks:

Finally, what does the Russian operation in Kharkiv say about the trajectory of the broader war in Ukraine?

By way of an answer Mr. Ryan writes:

“It demonstrates that despite its many battlefield and strategic defeats — and the lack of allies assisting them — the Russian president and his immediate circle are determined to continue this war.”

Mr. Ryan once again perceives cracks in Russian Society. He also refers to the “lack of allies” helping “…. the Russian president and his immediate circle….”.  Mr. Ryan does not explain what he means by the “lack of allies”.  I assume he may mean the rest of Russian Society outside of the members of the immediate circle. Mr. Ryan appears to intimate that the rest of Russian Society do not share this determination. The attitudes of the broader Russian society are more nuanced than what he hints at.  In this regard I refer you to an analysis prepared by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace late last year entitled My Country, Right or Wrong: Russian Public Opinion on Ukraine

Basing their analysis on survey data collected last year the authors in their opening remarks write:

“There was optimism that ordinary Russians would not countenance a war against a neighboring country.  But hopes of Russian grassroots opposition to the war were swiftly dashed. Indeed, public opinion polls have consistently shown overwhelming support (70 percent or higher) for what Moscow calls its “special military operation” in Ukraine. Contrary to expectations, Putin’s popularity has also seen a boost, similar to what happened in the immediate wake of the 2014 annexation of Crimea.”

More up to date research by the Levada Centre: Conflict with Ukraine: assessments of the end of July 2023 shows that these views have not changed much since June 22, 2022. In July 2023 in response to the [machine translated] question “Do you personally support or not the actions of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine? 45% responded “Definitely, yes” and 30% “Rather, yes”.

Regarding the perceptions of Russians of the performance of President Putin. The Levada Center published indicators concerning President Putin's activities. In July 2023 in response to the [machine translated] question “Do you generally approve or disapprove of Vladimir Putin's performance as president (prime minister) of Russia?” 82% of the respondents approved and 15% did not approve.

One might say that the above results are from a Russian source and so we need to be cautious. Let me say that the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace were confident enough to report the earlier results gathered by the Levada Center.

In the above referenced paper, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace does consider the question of the reliability of Russian Polls and concludes that results reported by the Levada Center do not bare up the hypothesis “…. that pressure on dissent and the introduction of new criminal penalties for charges of ‘discrediting the armed forces’ and other offenses mean that people are more scared and less willing to take part in opinion polls than they may have once been.” Given this we ought to at least consider the results when trying to understand the motives of President Putin and his immediate circle.

Getting back to Mr. Ryan’s commentary. He writes:

“And despite the setbacks and lack of success in the Gerasimov-led Russian offensive of 2023, the Russians retain the ability to attack the Ukrainians on the ground, with drone and missile strikes, and in the economic domain. The Russians intend to keep on fighting in the hope that Ukraine's supporters simply lose patience. “

Here we see that Mr. Ryan realises the determination of Russia to fight and he obliquely acknowledges the tenacity of the Russian military in their fighting ability as well as their aptness in using new technologies. Mr. Ryan also refers to Russia’s apparent success in the “economic domain” where the Russian economy seems to have weathered the western sanctions regime. The German data company Statista reported, in a post entitled Russia GDP monthly 2023 that in “…. May 2023, Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated to have increased by 5.4 percent compared to the same month of the previous year.”

Mr. Ryan sees another aspect of Russia’s strategy is to keep the war going long enough for Ukraine’s allies to feel war fatigue and lose their resolve to continue backing Ukraine. I would add that the current bleak outlook for economies in the world, including the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union it would not be surprising that the “supporters” of Ukraine, especially the populations in these nations become disheartened with the conflict and the degree to which they are prepared to support the war effort. The degree of support varies from country to country in Europe. The article One year on: European and American attitudes to the war in Ukraine published on the YouGov website assesses public opinion in Europe one year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The author of the article Mathew Smith, writing on the anniversary of the Russian Invasion opens his analysis with the following words:

“With today marking the first anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a new YouGov Eurotrack and accompanying US survey reveals that Western publics are at odds on some key issues surrounding the war.”

Returning to Mr. Ryan’s commentary he writes that within the context of defending the “Russian motherland” to retain power President Putin, is not looking at “popularity polls” but rather has his eye on the “hardcore nationalists” in his “circle to act against him.” This, according to Mr. Ryan is one factor that is driving President Putin and his supporters within this circle. Being sensitive to a “perception of weakness” President Putin is determined to prosecute the war to prevent a nationalist putsch against them.

Regarding “perceptions of weakness” the “Wagner mutiny” and the Russian public’s reaction to it Mr. Ryan believes that this will “…. impact on perceptions of Putin inside the Kremlin and in the Russian population more broadly,”. This is what Mr. Denis Volkov (Director of the Levada Center) wrote in an article entitled The Sociology of the Rebellion: What Imprint Did the Events of June 24 Leave on Public Opinion for Forbes (Russia) and posted under Levada Centre web site:

“…. the rebellion had a very limited impact on the ratings of the authorities. This state of affairs is recorded by all available studies. The ratings of Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Sergei Lavrov and the government as a whole have not changed.”

Note: The Levada Center is on the US Register of non-profit organizations-foreign agents.

In his commentary Mr. Ryan makes the following observation concerning Ukraine’s current counter offensive:

“But they have been slowly conducting attrition of Russian frontline forces in the south, as well as Russian headquarters, logistics and artillery. Russia's southern forces might face some peril in the coming weeks if their attrition continues and this shifts the correlation of forces in Ukraine's favour.”

Mr. Ryan downplays the effects these offensive actions during the course of June and July and now August is having on the attacking Ukrainian forces. No reference to the cost in terms of military vehicles, artillery systems and the thousands of soldiers who have perished in this attritional war in which a few kilometres and empty villages have been the bitter reward. Mr. Ryan predicts that the Ukrainian attrition will put Russia in a perilous position because of disruptions to its logistics and military headquarters and artillery. I have to say that this conclusion is bracketed with a big “if”. The current signs show that the “…. the correlation of forces in Ukraine's favour.” Are not heading in this direction.

One needs to look beyond Mr. Ryan’s assumptions to get a better picture of what is going on. Newsweek’s David Brennan recently reported, in an article entitled Ukraine Details 'Key Battles' in Counteroffensive that:

“Ukrainian progress has been relatively slow, with attacking units facing multiple lines of heavily mined Russian defensive positions. Casualties on both sides are thought to be high, though neither Kyiv nor Moscow releases such figures…... [President] Zelensky has defended the gradual nature of the counteroffensive, saying he will not risk the lives of soldiers unnecessarily. The president this weekend told CNN that the operation had been delayed due to a lack of weapons and munitions. Kyiv's forces, he said, still do not have sufficient supplies.”

Furthermore, Ellie Cook of Newsweek on August 6, 2023, reported Why U.S. War Tactics Are Failing in Ukraine. Mr. Ellie Cook reported that the tactics inculcated into Ukrainian troops are “failing”. Mr. Cook referred to an article published in the New York times that suggests the NATOs training has not been successful as initially expected.

CNN's Chief National Security correspondent Jim Sciutto wrote an article, published by CNN on August 8, 2023, Western allies receive increasingly ‘sobering’ updates on Ukraine’s counteroffensive: ‘This is the most difficult time of the war'. Mr. Sciutto in this article reports that the counteroffensive to "retake significant territory" is, according to a senior western diplomat ".... extremely, highly unlikely," to change the balance of the conflict in Ukraine's favour.

In summary, Mr. Ryan provides us with an analysis as to what he believes the drivers behind President Putin’s continuing to pursue the war. Internal politics within President Putin’s inner circle are one factor. Popular opinion in the broader Russian society is not suggested as playing a big part in President Putin’s calculations. Mr. Ryan does not say anything about the nuances in public opinion inside with respect to the war.  He does not countenance the possibility that President Putin may have substantial public support especially in the light of the cross-border incursions and drone attacks on Moscow may be hardening the opinion of the Russian public in terms of pursuing the war not simply against Ukraine but NATO as well. Perhaps this is encouraging Putin to continue with the fight.

The accumulating evidence is obvious. Russia’s push back on Ukrainian’s offensive to try and breakthrough the Surovikin line and other battle fronts; Ukraine’s disadvantages in weaponry and manpower; the increasing limitations on the part of NATO countries to continue supplying weapons and munitions. Then there is the surprising resilience of the Russian economy, little sign of regime changes in Moscow and mixed feelings amongst European citizens.

Despite all of this, in the last paragraph of his commentary Mr. Ryan captured the sense of the ill winds heading our way:

“The Ukrainians will not wish to withdraw from the territory that they regained last year at such a high cost. It will demand some tough calls on the allocation of Ukrainian forces between the north and the south. Much hard fighting remains ahead of us.”

I refer you to the very last sentence, one which I find troubling and somewhat ominous in which Mr. Ryan refers to “us” and his association of “us” with the “hard fighting” that lies “ahead of us”. It appears that the general narrative that we in the West are not a party to the war is being quietly set aside in Mr. Ryan’s lament.

Mr. Ryan does not offer a way out of this looming quagmire that does not involve the spilling of more blood and the waste of economic resources not just of Ukraine’s but also that of NATO and its supporters. He is scrupulous in not mentioning another possibility; that is of a negotiated solution. In the absence of such a possibility being countenanced by Mr. Ryan, there have been moves nonetheless taking place on the part of others.  The results of these moves are mixed and uncertain.

POLITICO’s Varg Folkman on July 30, 2023, published a report No cease-fire while Ukraine is on the offensive, Putin declares citing President Putin’s view on the matter of peace talks.

Within the context of a recent Russia-Africa summit in St. Petersburg between African leaders and President Putin where the Africans made a direct appeal for Moscow to end the war on “on the basis of justice and reason”.

According to Mr. Folkman:

“Vladimir Putin said he does not reject the idea of peace talks over Ukraine, but the Russian president added that there could be no cease-fire while Ukrainian forces are “on the offensive.”

Mr. Folkman also reported that President Putin as saying that “We cannot cease fire when we are under attack….”. Furthermore, President Putin, regarding peace talks also said: “In order for this process to begin, there needs to be agreement on both sides….”

Back-channel discussions had apparently been conducted, back in April 2023 between ex diplomats and academics representing the US, Richard Haass being the most notable and Russian officials such as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

NBC News writer Josh Lederman on July 6, 2023, in an article entitled Former U.S. officials have held secret Ukraine talks with Russians reported the following:

“A group of former senior U.S. national security officials has held secret talks with prominent Russians believed to be close to the Kremlin — and, in at least one case, with the country’s top diplomat — with the aim of laying the groundwork for negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, half a dozen people briefed on the discussions said.”

This was based on a report published in the Amsterdam headquartered Moscow Times. In his analysis Mr. Lederman made the following pertinent observation that suggests that these talks may not have amounted to much:

“Yet in the context of the Ukraine war, the notion of former U.S. officials’ engaging informally with Russians has caused a divide within the community of American diplomats, foreign policy scholars and national security professionals.”

However, on July 27, the aforementioned Moscow Times article entitled Former U.S. Official Shares Details of Secret ‘Track 1.5’ Diplomacy with Moscow was updated by Cameron Manley confirming that the “Secret diplomatic talks are ongoing between former senior U.S. national security officials and high-ranking members of the Kremlin, a former U.S. official directly involved in the talks has confirmed to The Moscow Times.”

In this his article Mr. Manly reported the comments of an ex- official as follows:

“He noted that Washington had also offered to help conduct fair referendums in the Russian-occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, in which residents would vote on whether they wished to be part of Ukraine or Russia.”

Mr. Manly went on to report that:

“Russia apparently declined this offer and claimed to have annexed the territories in September 2022 following referendums widely viewed as a sham.”

With respect to the potential of the secret discussion Mr. Manly refers us to comments made by one of the former US officials that “…. expressed a sense of impasse in the ongoing secret talks.”

Apart from this “back-channel” discussion there have been more public moves to discuss possible peace talks. On July 31, 2023, POLITICO published a commentary with the heading Russia will monitor Saudi-hosted Ukraine peace talks authored by Claudia Chiappa. This was based on a Wall Street Journal article. Ms. Chiappa wrote that: “Saudi Arabia is planning to host peace talks including Ukraine, Western nations and selected major developing countries in August”.

Ms. Chiappa also reported that “Russia said Monday it will closely follow talks on Ukraine set to take place in Saudi Arabia early next month.”

Note that these Saudi Arabian peace talks are a follow up to the talks held in Copenhagen in late June of this year to discuss Ukraine’s 10-point peace formula in a US sponsored attempt to persuade the nations of the Global South to adopt the formula.

In terms of the who will would be attending the talks officials from 30 countries were expected to attend the Saudi-hosted talks scheduled for the weekend of August 5 and 6. The standout is that Russia was not invited. The Jeddah talks have now concluded.

According to Bloomberg in an article by Alexander Nicholson published August 7, 2023, Ukraine Peace Plan Talks End in Saudi with Few Concrete Steps nothing definite was decided. Ukraine tried to convince the participating countries; these countries apparently not willing or eager to adopt its peace plan. The only tangible outcome was plans to put together working groups to look at several aspects of the Ukrainian peace formula in the areas of food and nuclear security.

From the Russian perspective the Russian News Agency TASS reported that a new peace plan for Ukraine was discussed at the Jeddah consultations. Saudi Arabia, along with some other countries proposed a new plan to be discussed alongside the Ukrainian formula. The Saudi Arabian plan proposed a ceasefire along the frontline, the commencement of talks brokered by the United Nations as well as a prisoner exchange.

On August 7, 2023, according to a report posted on the US News web site called Ukraine Hails Jeddah Talks as Blow to Russia, China Says It's Staying Impartial. This article sourced from Reuters reported that the Ukrainian President Chief of staff, Andriy Yermak said in a briefing in Kyiv that “…. no other peace initiatives were discussed at the weekend meeting in Jeddah apart from Ukraine's, and that all countries present at the talks had fully supported Ukrainian independence and territorial integrity.”

On August 8, 2023, CNN reporter Simone McCarthy wrote that China assures Russia it remains 'impartial' on Ukraine war after attending Saudi peace talks.

In this article Ms. McCarthy discusses a telephone conversation following the end of the international talks in Saudi Arabia. This conversation was held between the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Chinese Foreign minister Wang Y on Monday of this week. Regarding this conversation Ms. McCarthy wrote:

“Wang stressed to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that China and Russia are ‘trustworthy and reliable good friends and partners…. On the Ukraine crisis, China will uphold an independent and impartial position, sound an objective and rational voice, actively promote peace talks, and strive to seek a political solution on any international multilateral occasion,’ Wang said, according to a readout of the call released by China’s Foreign Ministry.”

According to Ms. McCarthy Mr. Lavrov “appreciates” and welcomes the constructive role of China in trying to bring about a solution to the “Ukraine crisis”.

I now draw your attention to an article Negotiating an End to the Ukraine War published in The National Interest on July 27, 2023, written by Paul R. Pillar. Mr. Pillar discusses the conditions which ultimately force belligerents to sit at the negotiating table using examples from history. Regarding the Russia-Ukraine war Mr. Pillar concluded his article as follows:

"In Ukraine, the bargaining gap that must be bridged is between Ukraine’s disinclination to formally cede any of its territory and Putin’s need to show some gain from his costly military misadventure. Some political issues probably will have to be in effect punted, with their eventual outcome uncertain, if any peace agreement is to be reached, despite the future risk of misunderstandings and festering grievances." 

I must make the following point about Mr. Pillar’s analysis. It only fleetingly places the conflict within a broader geopolitical context. Mr. Pillar does not make enough of the fact that in terms of NATO expansion, sanctions placed on Russia, and NATO’s military assistance to Ukraine that also makes the USA and NATO participants in the war.  So, it is not just two nations, Rusia and Ukraine that need to compromise. The policy makers in Washington and Brussels must also address the concerns that Russia has about the overall security situation in Europe.

Finally, George Beebe and James Webb writing for the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft offered a possible way forward for Ukraine out of what is increasing looking like an unsuccessful counteroffensive in the form of what they label Plan B.

I concur to a certain degree with Mr. Ryan when he speaks of the “hard fight” ahead. However, I see the fight as being one that strives for peace. 

I will leave you with this quote, attributed to Jean Jaurès Leader of the French Socialist Party delivered in the eventful year of 1914:

“Today you are told: act, always act! But what is action without thought? It is the barbarism born of inertia. You are told: brush aside the party of peace; it saps your courage! But I tell you to stand for peace today is to wage the most heroic of battles….” [1]

References

[1] Brown, Frederick. The Embrace of Unreason. France 1914 – 1940. Page 13. Alfred A. Knopf New York. 2014.