The Sufficiency of Leadership in War
In the mix of things is the secret ingredient of
leadership sufficient?
On May 23, 2023 the government funded Australian
Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) published an analytical piece entitled: Leadership is Ukraine's secret ingredient in war with Russia. This article is written
by Major General Mick Ryan (retired); hereafter referred to as Mr. Ryan.
Mr. Ryan writes his analysis in the context of the Russian-Ukraine
war. In the article he describes a general theory of how civilian and military
leaderships can co-operate in times of war. I will call this theory Mr. Ryan’s War
Leadership Model.
Mr. Ryan’s analysis is overly simple and misleading as it
does not take into account the full complexity of the interactions between
aspects of warfare and politics and economics that happen in war time as is the
case with the Russian-Ukraine war. In my post I am going to analyse the War
Leadership Model outlined by Mr. Ryan in order to judge its merits on the basis
of the broader geopolitical and geoeconomic contexts.
Mr. Ryan’s War Leadership Model, offers a top-down functional
description of a civilian – military system based on certain simple parameters.
As long as these assumptions (I will call them inputs and assumptions) hold
then the system depicted in the model remains in equilibrium and outcomes have
a good chance of eventuating. Mr. Ryan does not consider that once other factors
impinge on the model then this equilibrium starts to breakdown resulting in a
chaotic state of affairs where outcomes are not certain at all.
What are the components of Mr. Ryan’s War Leadership Model? What
follows is my understanding of this Model.
Mr. Ryan commences his analysis by pointing out the
following four aspects of combat power needed to defeat an adversary in war:
1.
Weapons
2.
Munitions
3.
Moral
4.
Intellectual
I will describe aspects 1 and 2 as the inputs to Mr. Ryan’s War
Leadership Model. These inputs provide the means to conduct a war. I note that
Mr. Ryan does not refer to trained non-officer military personnel (the foot
soldiers) as aspects of combat power or inputs in their own right. I will
discuss this aspect further below.
Aspects 3 and 4 constitute the core leadership competencies
needed to transform the inputs into successful outcomes. The moral and
intellectual is the domain of leaders: political (presidents and ministers) and
military (senior military leadership) that bring about the transformation.
According to Mr. Ryan the moral and intellectual aspects of
leadership are as follows:
“The intellectual components provide the knowledge of
war, strategy and cognitive capability — the "what to think". The
moral component reinforces culture, values and legitimacy, and is a foundation
for the will to fight. “
Mr. Ryan is correct in writing that the intellectual aspect
plays an important role in transforming weapons and munitions and available
human resources into positive outcomes.
Having specified these aspects Mr. Ryan goes onto describe
the operational components of the War Leadership Model. This consists of a
top-down functional hierarchy not dissimilar to the hierarchy of a corporation.
At the top these are the:
1.
Political Leadership
2.
Military Leadership
Mr. Ryan writes that both the political and military
leaderships as in all democracies work within an “unequal dialogue”. With
respect to an ongoing war this relationship involves a dialogue that is robust
and interactive. Both the political and military leadership have a say but only
the political leadership in the form of a president takes the final decision to
go to war.
Mr Ryan then goes on to discuss the nature of the military
leadership hierarchy with the Commander -in-chief at the top commanding a level
of senior generals of the army, navy and air force as well as a joint forces
command and other functions such as intelligence services and logistical
support.
In turn these generals in exercising their leadership transform
and operationalise the strategic military vision to quote Mr. Ryan:
“…. into plans, fighting forces, logistic support, air
defence, long-range strike, intelligence collection and the many other vital
military functions that must be synchronised for a nation to win a war.”
In Mr. Ryan’s War Leadership Model, the generals need to be
skilful in the art and science generalship. Mr. Ryan draws the following lesson
concerning the art of war:
“Good generalship is key to winning wars, as is doing
so in an ethical and just manner.”
After discussing the top layers of a military hierarchy in
terms of a commander-in-chief that commands a layer of generals Mr. Ryan turns
his attention to the more numerous layers of military personnel that the
generals command and these are tactical leaders whose focus it is to rehearse,
prepare and execute close combat in order to defeat an adversary.
Mr. Ryan identifies these tactical leaders as:
“…. the section, platoon, company, squadron,
battalion, regiment, wing and brigade commanders….”
These tactical leaders are the source of purpose, direction
and inspiration to the myriad troops they lead. These troops are would be professional
soldiers or drawn from “varied strata of society” united by a common
purpose to defend their nation and have accepted the ultimate sacrifice in
doing so.
I would at this point like to dwell for a moment on the use
of Mr. Ryan’s reference to professional soldiers and the varied strata of
society. These are the foot soldiers. As I mentioned above these are the inputs
that Mr. Ryan does not include in the four aspects needed to conduct
warfare.
Finally, Mr Ryan writes:
“Like no others of their society, tactical leaders are
given the profound and terrible responsibility of leading their units in
killing their enemies on the battlefield. It is the purest, and most
horrendous, expression of human will.”
I have discussed the inputs and operational assumptions of
the Mr. Ryans War Leadership Model and the functional components of this model.
Now, the true test of a theoretical model’s validity is to gauge how it
performs when confronted with a real-world system, in this case the Russian-Ukraine
war and the geopolitical environment.
Looking at the real-world dynamics at play the inputs to Mr.
Ryan’s War Leadership Model may not necessarily get transformed, by leaders
into the expected military victory. The reason for this conclusion is that the
real effectiveness of the inputs to the War Leadership Model are not optimal.
Also, there are many contextual variables that the model does not allow for.
Let’s revisit the two inputs Mr. Ryan’s War Leadership Model.
These are:
1.
Weapons
2.
Munitions
As I mentioned earlier, I would add the foot soldiers; the
professional soldiers and conscripts as crucial aspects and inputs that the
military leadership have at their disposal to conduct a war. This is the input
of human resources that will make the ultimate sacrifice.
With respect to weapons and munitions Mr. Ryan “…. celebrates
the valuable commitments of Western hardware in preparing the Ukrainians for
the offensives to come…. “.
However, as Mr. Ryan appreciates this is not enough to
ensure a victorious outcome; he writes:
“…. we should not forget the leaders that turn these
mountains of material into effective war-fighting formations.”
Mr. Ryan does not quantify the “mountains of material”. Nor does he adequately explain how the moral
and intellectual aspects working in an uncertain context turn this material
into effective war fighting formations. Moral integrity, intellectual prowess and
NATO and EU assistance however do not on their own guarantee a victorious
outcome.
There are several other factors at play, that do have a
bearing on the outcomes of the war that Mr. Ryan’s analysis does not take into
account. I now intend to discuss why these assumptions are problematic; that
work against the efforts of military leadership.
Factor One: The human and leadership resources within Ukraine
needed to not only plan and coordinate but also fight the war are not optimal
and sustainable.
During
the course of the long war the passage of time and the nature of the war being one
of attrition have shown that the internal economic and military resources of
Ukraine are being challenged. I assume that Mr. Ryan, although he does not say
so is cognisant of this because of his reference to the mountains of material that
has had to be supplied by the western allies to assist the war effort. If
Ukraine were able to wage the war on its own then this assistance would not be
needed.
War
on the Rocks published a commentary on June 2, 2023. The title of this
commentary is: WHAT THE UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES NEED TO DO TO WIN. The
commentary is written by Erik Kramer AND Paul Schneider.
Messrs.
Kramer and Schneider as military trainers had been involved with the training of
Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF). They summarise their concerns about UAF
leadership, training practices and military logistics as follows:
“Based
on our nine months of training with all services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces,
to include the Ground Forces (Army), Border Guard Service, National Guard,
Naval Infantry (Marines), Special Operations Forces, and Territorial Defense
Forces, we have observed a series of common trends: lack of mission command,
effective training, and combined arms operations; ad hoc logistics and
maintenance; and improper use of special operations forces. These trends have
undermined Ukraine’s resistance and could hinder the success of the ongoing
offensive.”
Messrs.
Kramer and Schneider highlighted problems in the following area:
·
Lack of Mission Command
·
Lack of Effective Training
·
Lack of Combined Arms Operations
·
Ad Hoc Logistics and Maintenance
·
Improperly Used Special Operations Forces
Messrs.
Kramer and Schneider ask: How to Fix These Problems? Their
answer:
“The
solutions to these challenges require a reallocation of resources and a change
of mentality. This is, arguably, tougher than allocating more resources and
spending more money. We recommend a centrally planned, executed at the lower
level, synchronized training program focusing on a twenty- to thirty-day
training regime for each brigade.”
Factor 2 Two: Ukraine has abundant political, economic
and military support from the West
The
duration of the war is testing the limits of the economic and military support
that the western allies can provide. This factor has direct bearing on the
performance of the Ukrainian leadership as formulated in Mr. Ryan’s War
Leadership Model to achieve victory in combat.
Regarding
the economic and military aspects of the western military and industrial base
to continue supplying weapons and munitions. The mountains of weapons that Mr.
Ryan refers to is fast diminishing and difficult to replace. Once again, I must say that I would be
surprised that Mr. Ryan would not be cognisant of this even though he does
mention this in his analysis.
I refer you to an article published by the Royal United
Services Institute (RUSI) posted on their web site on June 17, 2022. The
article is entitled: The Return of Industrial Warfare. It was written by
Alex Vershinin. I find it hard to
believe that Mr. Ryan would not be aware of Mr. Vershinin’s insightful
analysis.
Mr. Vershinin concludes his analysis by writing:
“The war in Ukraine demonstrates that war between peer
or near-peer adversaries demands the existence of a technically advanced, mass
scale, industrial-age production capability. The Russian onslaught consumes
ammunition at rates that massively exceed US forecasts and ammunition
production. For the US to act as the arsenal of democracy in defence of
Ukraine, there must be a major look at the manner and the scale at which the US
organises its industrial base. This situation is especially critical because behind
the Russian invasion stands the world’s manufacturing capital – China. As the
US begins to expend more and more of its stockpiles to keep Ukraine in the war,
China has yet to provide any meaningful military assistance to Russia. The West
must assume that China will not allow Russia to be defeated, especially due to
a lack of ammunition. If competition between autocracies and democracies has
really entered a military phase, then the arsenal of democracy must first
radically improve its approach to the production of materiel in wartime.”
The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
published a commentary on September 16, 2022 entitled: Is the United States
Running out of Weapons to Send to Ukraine? This piece was written by Mark
F. Cancian. In his opening remarks Mr. Cancian makes the following
observations:
“The United States has given Ukraine dozens of
different munitions and weapon systems. In most instances, the amounts given to
Ukraine are relatively small compared to U.S. inventories and production
capabilities. However, some U.S. inventories are reaching the minimum levels
needed for war plans and training. The key judgment for both munitions and
weapons is how much risk the United States is willing to accept.”
Another report that Mr. Ryan surely must be aware of is one
published by the RAND Corporation in January 2023. The report is entitled: Avoiding
a Long War U.S. Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict.
The authors are Samuel Charap and Miranda Priebe. Regarding the Russian-Ukraine
war the authors commence their report with the question “How does this
end?
The authors write:
“The trajectory and ultimate outcome of the war will,
of course, be determined largely by the policies of Ukraine and Russia. But
Kyiv and Moscow are not the only capitals with a stake in what happens. This
war is the most significant interstate conflict in decades, and its evolution
will have major consequences for the United States.”
Regarding global economic ramifications Mr. Charap and Ms.
Priebe point out that these:
“…. disruptions stemming from the war will continue
and possibly multiply as long as the conflict goes on.”
In this regard Mr. Charap and Ms. Priebe draw our attention
to the fact that when the war started there was a steep increase in the price
of energy. This sharp rise has fueled inflation as well as slowing down global
economic growth. The impacts of these tendencies have hit Europe hardest of
all. They inform us that Europe will expect to have 150,000 excess deaths due to
the increase in the price of energy.
Also, Mr. Charap and Ms. Priebe inform us that from the
global perspective food security has also been impacted by the war’s effect on
Ukraine’s food exports and the export of Russian restrictions on fertilizers which
worsens an already parlous situation arising from extreme weather patterns and
COVID. All this has led to an increase in food and fertiliser prices.
Mr. Charap and Ms. Priebe point out that apart from these
economic consequences on the world the Foreign Policy of the USA is also
impacted. The USA will be constrained with respect to its other global foreign
policy priorities.
With the interests of the USA in mind energy and food prices
as well as other factors such as USA foreign policy Mr. Charap and Ms. Priebe lament:
“In short, the consequences of a long war—ranging from
persistent elevated escalation risks to economic damage—far outweigh the
possible benefits.”
With respect to the position of NATO’s stockpiles of weapons
and ammunition Reuters published an article on February 13, 2023 written by Sabine
Siebold and John Irish. The article bears the title: NATO expected to raise
munitions stockpile targets as war depletes reserves.
The authors of this article make the following observations:
“NATO is expected to ask its members to raise its
ammunition stockpiles which have been badly depleted by the war in Ukraine, as
allies try to put arms supplies to Kyiv and their own militaries on a
sustainable footing after a year in crisis mode.
Even before Russia's invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24
last year, many NATO countries fell short of meeting the alliance's stockpiling
targets, as officials considered wars of attrition with large-scale artillery
battles a thing of the past.
But the pace of deliveries to Ukraine, where Kyiv's
troops are firing up to 10,000 artillery shells daily, has drained Western
inventories and exposed holes in the efficiency, speed and manpower of supply
chains.”
More recent analysis was published by
Reuters on May 4, 2023. The article is entitled: Global ammunition race may
decide Ukraine war. It is written by Peter Apps. This is another piece of
reporting that Mr. Ryan surely must have been aware of when advocating his War
Leadership Model. As the title suggests more than
leadership is needed in the context of this war.
Mr.
Apps begins his analysis by writing:
“Even
in the Cold War, U.S. and NATO military planners believed they needed no more
than 30 days of artillery stocks in Europe, as any conflict was likely to
either end within that timeframe or escalate into a global atomic war. Few of
its European allies ever made enough shells to reach that level, and all
Western states have dramatically reduced that effort since.”
Mr.
Apps concludes that regarding ammunition production to support the Ukrainian
war effort Western powers are in uncertain terrain. He ends his article as
follows:
"After
the last few months of reviewing the battlefield in Ukraine, we and our allies
have almost full knowledge of how much ammunition is being used daily, weekly
and monthly," said Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki in March.
"These are quantities many times greater than those available to most NATO
countries today. For the West, this is uncharted territory.”
The
RUSI, RAND Corporation and Reuters reports I mention above are just some of the
myriads of reports published in the last few months that indicate that Mr.
Ryan’s Mountain is fast eroding to the degree that it is proving to be a risky headache
for the Western and Ukrainian leaderships regarding the direction of the war.
In
not referencing these major reports, published well before his analysis was
posted by the ABC Mr. Ryan is painting a misleading picture by emphasising
leadership as the secret to Ukraine’s chances of pulling off a victory
against Russia. The reality is that weapons and munitions remain the real
factors that provide the capacity to pull off victory. Without an adequate
supply of these leadership is difficult and faces many risks.
The
cost to the European Union (EU) has also been significant in terms of the draw down
in NATO member country weapons and munition stockpiles as well as direct
monetary allocation given to Ukraine. To date there have also been direct costs
to the citizens of the EU as a by-product of the Western sanctions war on
Russia.
The European Union External Action Service web site reported
a speech given by Joseph Borrell at Shangri La Dialogue on June 3, 2023.
Regarding the financial sacrifices, particularly the cost to the citizenry of
Europe Mr. Borrell declared:
“For the first time ever, we have been funding
military support to a country under attack. Providing about €40 billion of
military support to Ukraine, coming from the [EU] Institutions, coming from the
resources I manage in Brussels, and coming from the Member States. Yes, much
less than the US support. But if you add up all the support – military,
civilian, economic, financial and humanitarian – the level of support to Ukraine
is about €60 billion for Europe. But let me show another figure which is really
impressive: if you include the support that the European governments have had
to pay in order to help their families and firms to face the high prices of
electricity, of food, the subsidies to our people in order to face the
consequences of the war is €700 billion – ten times more than the support for
Ukraine. Which shows that the consequences of this war are not reduced to
what’s happening in Ukraine but to the shockwaves that the war has been sending
all around the world.”
I find Mr.
Borrell’s apparent delight in the expenditure of €700 billion
required to offset the pain experienced by the EU citizenry very disconcerting.
Factor Three: Russia’s military leadership is assumed
to be weak, corrupt and incompetent.
Regarding
the leadership factor in his article Mr. Ryan writes:
“It
is an art the Ukrainians have honed during the war, and one almost entirely
ignored by the professionally and ethically corrupt Russian Army.”
Scanning
the Western press’s coverage of the Russia-Ukraine War article after article
report the weaknesses and incompetence inherent in the Russian military. Regarding the Russian army there is no doubt
that in the Ukraine theatre of war there have been cases of mistakes, weakness,
morally suspect and incompetent actions. I am also sure that the same can be
said for the Ukrainian military leadership.
However, Mr. Ryan has provided a one-side understanding by
not mentioning the resilience, adaptability and willingness to learn from
experience on the part of the Russian military leadership. Mr. Ryan ignores
this all together.
I refer you to a very detailed report published by RUSI on
May 19, 2023. The report is authored by Dr Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds. The
disturbing title of the report is: Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the
Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine
It is worth quoting Dr. Watlings and Mr. Reynolds opening
paragraph:
“THE TENDENCY IN much of the international discourse
surrounding the Russian military
has been to write it off as tactically inept,
technically deficient and morally broken. These
criticisms have more than a grain of truth to them.
Nevertheless, they tend to extrapolate
from the performance of certain Russian units to the
whole force. Alongside their deficiencies,
Russian forces have demonstrated that much of their
equipment is effective, highly lethal and
adaptable to a range of threats. While there are
serious deficiencies in Russian capabilities,
these are most pronounced in conducting offensive
operations. Conversely, many of Russia’s
combat support arms have not only demonstrated
reasonable proficiency but have also shown
that they are able to adapt to emerging threats.”
Once again, I would be surprised if Mr. Ryan is not aware of
this report.
Factor Four: Russia’s economic and military base
cannot sustain the war effort.
Mr. Ryan in his analysis does not reference Russia’s
economic and military capacities at all which is a critical omission. The
resilience of the Russian economy to withstand the sanctions imposed on it by
the western allies has surprised many. The speedy way in which the Russian
military industrial complex has maintained and ramped up the production of
weapons and munitions has also surprised many. What has surprised even more is
the way that this war has shown up the weaknesses inherent in the West’s
military industrial complex to keep up with Ukraine’s military needs for
munitions and weapons. I refer you to the RUSI and CSIS reports I referenced
above. Indeed, recent reports suggest that Russian military expenditure on the
war continues to be at manageable levels.
The Markets Insider web site published an article on June 3,
2023 authored by Phil Rosen. The article is entitled: Russia Is Spending
Surprisingly Little on Its War on Ukraine.
Referring to a report published by the Economist magazine
Mr. Rosen informs us that Russia is spending a small amount of its GDP on
fighting the war.
Mr. Rosen writes:
“Russia's invasion of Ukraine has come at a steep
geopolitical price and tens of thousands of people have died, but a new
analysis by the Economist suggests the country is actually spending a small
amount on the war effort.”
“The direct fiscal cost of the war — spending on
soldiers and machines — is estimated to be about 3% of Russia's GDP, or roughly
$67 billion a year, according to the report. That figure comes from a
comparison of Moscow's pre-invasion spending forecasts for defense and security
with what it actually spent.”
“By historical standards, the current war pales in
comparison. The Soviet Union during World War II, for example, spent about 61%
of GDP, and the US at the same time put about 50% of its GDP toward the
conflict.
However, 3% is substantially higher than the 0.4% of
GDP the Soviet Union spent on its war on Afghanistan.”
As I have laid out above there are many contextual factors
whose dynamic affect Mr. Ryan does not consider in his analysis. Leadership is
not the only factor at play in this extremely complex war. As I have tried to
show there are more powerful factors in play. Weapons, munitions are important
inputs but as I have shown the diminishing quantity and quality of these. When
these aspects are factored in with the sustained power of the Russian military
industrial complex the West’s and Ukraine’s ability to indefinitely continue
with the conflict is problematic.
Mr. Ryan’s War Leadership Model does not articulate what a
victory would look like and how long it would take. Neither does the model
define the geopolitical and economic interests that the western NATO allies are
prepared to sacrifice in order to achieve the desired victory.
It is these kinds of dynamic and complex variables that the
Ukrainian political and military leaderships and the NATO supporters need to
factor into their joint war plans. Good leadership is not sufficient. An
important factor to consider would be the secret ingredient called peacemaking,
a moral aspect that I am sure Mr. Ryan knows about but has not included in his War
Leadership Model.
References
Leadership
is Ukraine's secret ingredient in war with Russia - ABC News
What
the Ukrainian Armed Forces Need to Do to Win - War on the Rocks
https://warontherocks.com/2023/06/what-the-ukrainian-armed-forces-need-to-do-to-win/
The
Return of Industrial Warfare | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org)
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/return-industrial-warfare
Is
the United States Running out of Weapons to Send to Ukraine? (csis.org)
https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-running-out-weapons-send-ukraine
Avoiding a Long
War: U.S. Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict | RAND
https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA2510-1.html
NATO
expected to raise munitions stockpile targets as war depletes reserves | Reuters
Column:
Global ammunition race may decide Ukraine war: Peter Apps | Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/world/global-ammunition-race-may-decide-ukraine-war-peter-apps-2023-05-04/
Singapore:
Speech by HR/VP Borrell at Shangri La Dialogue | EEAS (europa.eu)
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/singapore-speech-hrvp-borrell-shangri-la-dialogue_en
Russia
Is Spending Surprisingly Little on Its War on Ukraine (businessinsider.com)
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